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Abstract 
Self-serving biases lead people to see themselves and their future through rose-colored 
glasses. New research by Kouchaki and Gino suggests this rosy view also extends backward: 
memories of unethical behavior are less vivid than memories of good deeds. This so-called 
“unethical amnesia” has many individual benefits, but also carries social costs.  
 
 
“A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and their motives – of 
approving of some and disapproving of others”.  
--Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex  
 
Charles Darwin argued that a defining feature of human morality is an ability to 
reflect upon past misdeeds (1). But recent work by Kouchaki and Gino (2) questions this 
ability. In nine studies, participants were asked to either remember events in which they 
cheated, imagine possible events in which they could have cheated, or were given the 
opportunity to actually cheat. A few days later, they were asked to recall the details of these 
events. In each of the studies, participants who cheated (or imagined cheating) recalled the 
events less vividly compared to participants who did not cheat. This so-called “unethical 
amnesia” only affected the experience of recollecting one’s own immoral actions; people 
reported remembering vividly others’ unethical behaviour, as well as personal events that 
were unpleasant but not immoral. Unethical amnesia had clear benefits for dishonest 
participants, relieving the emotional discomfort spurred by their immoral actions. However, 
unethical amnesia also had social costs: the less vivid and clear participants perceived their 
unethical past, the more they cheated again later. The findings are consistent with the idea 
that people seek to balance self-interest against maintaining a positive self-concept (3). 
Unethical amnesia allows people to behave selfishly while preserving a moral self-image.  
What cognitive mechanisms might give rise to unethical amnesia? The fact that it was 
observed several days after cheating, but not immediately after, implicates biased retrieval 
rather than biased encoding. Research on motivated forgetting shows that suppression of 
unwanted memories during retrieval interferes with long-term retention of the undesirable 
memory traces (4). This effect is cumulative, so that the more times an unwanted memory is 
suppressed, the less likely it will be remembered. As a result, people might selectively forget 
the more unflattering chapters of their past. Such retrospective editing of memories in the 
service of a positive self-image in some ways resembles prospective editing of beliefs, which 
leads to unrealistic optimism (5). Here, the learning process is biased in a way that causes 
people to integrate good news but neglect bad news when updating their beliefs. The studies 
by Kouchaki and Gino imply that self-enhancing biases can operate retrospectively as well as 
prospectively. Studies of unrealistic optimism indicate that biased updating can lead to 
objectively inaccurate beliefs. One open question is whether unethical amnesia involves 
impaired objective memories of one’s own actions as well as a diminished subjective 
 2 
experience of remembering. In other words, do people actually forget the objective facts of 
their own misdeeds, or are they merely unwilling to conjure the dirty details when prompted? 
Neuroscience research suggests that suppressing the retrieval of unwanted memories 
involves an inhibitory control process mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) (4). 
During retrieval suppression LPFC not only banishes the unwanted memory from awareness, 
but also inhibits activity in hippocampal regions associated with episodic recollection and 
long-term storage. LPFC has also been implicated in unrealistic optimism, where reduced 
tracking of worse-than-expected information is associated with a failure to integrate bad news 
into one’s beliefs about the future (5). We speculate that LPFC may also be involved in 
unethical amnesia, with LPFC activation during the recall of unethical past behavior 
suppressing uncomfortable memories from consciousness and reducing the likelihood of 
recalling them in the future. Curiously, LPFC also plays a central role in following moral 
rules. LPFC is activated when people comply with fairness norms and resist temptations to 
lie, and disrupting activity in this region reduces norm compliance (6). Thus, the same brain 
region that curbs lying and cheating might shift gears once a moral transgression has 
occurred, controlling potential damage to one’s image by suppressing memories of the 
transgression – a sort of neural public relations manager. 
 Unpacking the temporal dynamics of unethical amnesia can also clarify the influence 
of past unethical behaviour on present moral conduct. Sometimes past misdeeds can lead 
people to compensate with increased moral behavior, a phenomenon known as “moral 
compensation”, but this is not always observed (7). In particular, recollecting past good 
behavior seems to exert more consistent and stronger effects on subsequent moral decisions 
than recollecting past negative behaviour. Kouchaki and Gino’s study offers a potential 
explanation: flattering memories may influence current behavior more strongly than 
unflattering ones because memories of good deeds are more vivid, clear and detailed than 
memories of bad deeds. This observation also suggests we may need to re-evaluate studies 
that compared the effects of recalling good and bad deeds on behavior, since these memories 
appear to be mismatched in vividness and detail. Furthermore, because unethical amnesia 
might take time to develop, there may be a limited time window in which moral 
compensation can occur: perhaps only in the immediate aftermath of a transgression, when 
people can still remember their bad behavior, are they likely to engage in compensatory 
behavior.  
Darwin’s claim that morality requires memory raises the question of why unethical 
amnesia evolved in humans. We suggest that unethical amnesia benefits individuals both by 
protecting against psychopathology (Box 1) and by facilitating social impression 
management. Because a commitment to moral rules increases one’s attractiveness as a social 
partner (8), people have a strong incentive to convince others they will stick to those rules, 
and one reliable strategy for persuading others is to first persuade oneself (9). Conveniently 
forgetting the times you broke the rules makes it easier to convince yourself and others that 
you are a stickler for the rules. Indeed, a difficulty with recalling past moral transgressions 
may itself serve as a cue for inferring good character. Our tribal instincts may very well 
extend these self-deceptive memory biases to other members of our group. Examples of such 
collective amnesia unfortunately litter the pages of history books, where whitewashed 
narratives replace the despicable episodes many would rather forget. Despite the tempting 
benefits of unethical amnesia, we must beware its social costs.   
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Box 1: Individual costs of impaired unethical amnesia  
After a moral transgression, people can react either with guilt (“I did something bad”) or with 
shame (“I’m a bad person”). Shame, but not guilt, has been persistently linked with mood and 
anxiety disorders, where a transition from guilt to shame following a moral transgression sets 
off persistent rumination and self-criticism, leading to symptoms of depression and anxiety 
(10). We suggest that unethical amnesia may help prevent a maladaptive transition from guilt 
to shame. Feelings of guilt experienced immediately after committing a moral transgression 
may induce a motivation to make amends, but once the episode has passed unethical amnesia 
may prevent intrusive memories of past misdeeds from tarnishing one’s self-concept, thus 
curtailing the development of shame. Those who are unable to actively forget unpleasant 
aspects of one’s past may therefore have a higher risk of developing negative self-views. 
Consistent with this idea, the same disorders associated with high levels of shame also 
involve deficits in inhibiting unwanted thoughts and memories. (4). A particularly 
noteworthy phenomenon is scrupulosity, a variant of obsessive-compulsive disorder where 
people obsess over the possibility they have committed a moral transgression (11). Future 
studies might investigate whether impaired unethical amnesia can predict later development 
of shame-related psychopathology.  
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